found themselves in court. as a result of disen chanted franchisees. These companies include Shakey·s. Mister Donut of America, Midas Muffler, Chicken Delight, Schwinn, H&R Block, Chick N'Joy, Chock Full O'Nuts, Mr. Steak, Elec tric Computer Programming Institute, The South land Corporation (7-Eleven Stores). Network Cinema Corporation (Jerry Lewis), and A&W.
Sidney Diamond suggests that the current legal problems confronting franchising fall into three main areas: (I) misrepresentations by franchisors to potential franchisees about the operation of the franchise (the "disclosure" problem), (2) restric tions by franchisors on the source or supplies or services purchased by their franchisees (the "tying agreement" problem), and (3) onerous termina tion provisions in the franchise agreement (the "capricious termination" problem).2 These prob lems are receiving the attention of trade associa tions in the franchising industry. state legis latures. the Congress, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),1 as discussed below.
The two major franchising trade associations. The International Franchise Association and the National Association of Franchise Companies. are concerned about the legal problems facing their members and have tried to establish self regulation through codes of ethics. However. since there are hundreds of franchisors that do not belong to either association, and since both associations lack effective sanctions to enforce their ethical -codes, trade association efforts alone are unlikely to eliminate the problems confront ing franchising.
The individual states have begun to pass laws regulating the franchise industry. Although these state laws are chiefly of the "full disclosure" vari ety, a few states have also passed so-called fair practice laws. Full disclosure laws are designed to protect prospective franchisees from franchisor misrepresentations by requiring franchisors to provide each prospective franchisee with sufficient unbiased information to enable him to make a sound investment decision. 4 As part of the full disclosure provisions, franchisors usually must disclose any requirements that the fran chisee purchase supplies from the franchisor or his designated suppliers. Full disclosure laws have been passed (as of this writing) in the legis latures of California. Hawaii. Illinois. Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon. Rhode Island, South Dakota. Washington. Wisconsin, and the Province of AJ berta. Canada.
Fair practice laws have been passed in the legislatures of California. Connecticut. Delaware. New Jersey. Virginia. Washington. and Wiscon sin. These laws are designed to protect the fran chisee by prohibiting the franchisor from using unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Although fair practice laws differ substantially from state to state. franchisors are usually prohibited from such practices as: (1) requiring a franchisee to purchase goods or services from the franchisor or his designated suppliers unless it is 1"easonably necessary to maintain control over the nature and quality of the goods or services; (2) discriminating between franchisees in the charges of roY3lties, goods, services, advertising services, and the like, unless reasonably justifiable; (3) selling a product or service to a franchisee for more than a fair or reasonable price; (4) competing with, or granting franchises to compete with. a franchisee in the relevant market area specifically listed in the franchisee agreement; and (5) 
Tying Agreements in Franchising
As the state legislatures. Congress. and the FTC both pass and ponder legislative solutions. the flood of franchisee versus franchisor litigation continues. Much of the litigation concerns restric tions by the franchisor on the source of supplies. The Select Committee on Small Business feels that one of the more serious problems facing fran chisors is the matter of "tie-ins," the policy whereby a seller. by conditioning the sale of a desirable product over which he has sufficient control. upon the purchase of other less desirable products, requires the pur cha'icr to buy both the "tying" and the "tied" products from him/'
In the case of franchising, the tying product is till' franchise itself and the tied products are the supplies the franchisee must purchase to operate his business. Benjamin Glosband. a legal expert. believes the problem of restrictions on the source of supplies or services is at the heart of almost every complaint pending against franchisors:
The Federal Trade Commission has received numerous complaints alleging that the fran chisor is requiring the franchisee to purchase supplies at outrageous prices from the fran chisor or designated supplier. This type of complaint has been the basis of a number of antitrust suits-governmental and private -charging the franchisor with involvement in an exclusive dealing arrangement or a tie in arrangement. The present article will tirst examine the pros and cons of tying agreements in franchising. will briefly review the legal status of tying agree ments. and then will present the results oi an empirical inwstigation of three hasic questions concerning the impact of tying agreements in franchising: (I) How widespl'cad is the practice of franchisees being rl'l..juin:d to purchase supplies from their franchisors? (2) Do franchisees who are requil'ed to purchase supplies from their fran chisors pay competitive prices for these supplies? (3) What are the effects. if any, on franchisees of this requirement?
Tying Agreements: Pro Franchisors give two primary justifications for requiring their franchisees to purchase supplies from them: (1) the franchisor can buy the supplies cheaper because of volume purchases, and (2) The franchisor, who cannot be assured uf his ability to direct the uniformity and pre serve the quality of his product. will simpl\'
Journal of Marketing, July 1975 elect to cease franchising. The franchisee, who cannot be assured that the consumer ac ceptance of his franchised goods or services can be protected by the franchisor, will have lost much uf the value of his investment. The American consumer cannot but be harmed by the deteriuration in quality and the de creased confldence in the individual outlet which will inevitably flow from the atrophy uf the franchising system.'o Tying Agreements: Con
In addition to royalty payments, franchise fees, and rent payments; a major way for franchisors to secure revenue is through the sale of supplies and raw materials to their franchisees. II Equity suggests that franchisors should be permitted to make a l-eturn on this service as long as fran chisees reap the benefits claimed for centralized or mass purchasing, However, critics claim that franchisors are requiring franchisees to purchase supplies and raw materials at prices far above those of the competitive market. Numerous cases have been cited in support of this contention. As examples of this practice. the Select Committee on Small Business reported that: "A gallon of maraschino cherries costing $1.50 was just re labeled by Howard Johnson and priced at $4.50. Shakey's charges $21.50 for the spice blend which costs them $3.00."12 In the committee's eyes. these were but two examples where franchisors were requiring their franchisees to purchase sup plies at exorbitant prices.
According to Harold Brown, a strong critic of franchising. one hardly need speculate on the consequences of overcharges. As an illustration, Brown cites the case of a prominent restaurant chain with more than 500 outlets:
In 1945. about 20 percent were owned by the franchisur and 80 percent by the fran chisL'Cs. By 1960, the situation had reversed, and the franchisor owned more than 80 per cent of the outlets. The financially pressed franchisees had cut down on servings and service, bon'owed to the limit, and ultimately sun-endered their franchises to chisor-expressing grati tude for leased from personal guaranty. Brown argues that preventing the franchise\:' from buying on the open market harms the Inm chisee, the third-party supplier. and the consumer.14 Franchisees are prevented from mak ing purchases at the lowest prices and on the best available terms. Third-party suppliers, tlwrerure, lose the opportunity to compete for the trade of the franchisees. And, in tum, the consumer suffers because of the secondary interference with the normal operation of the marketplace.
Tying Agreements: Legal Issues
Is it legal for franchisors to have purchase re quirements or tying agreements? As previously discussed, tying agreements may arise out of a franchisor's effort to control both the qualitv and the uniformity of his trademarked product'> or services. Such control can be both legally and commercially necessaJ-Y. Federal law, according to the Lanham Act, provides that a trademark owner must insure that the products or services identified by the mark meet all owner quality standards or risk cancellation or abandoninent of his trademark rights}S The Lanham Act, how ever, specifically provides that .an antitrust viola tion is not condoned by trademark law.
Tying provisions in franchise agreements have to date presented both a trade regulation problem under Section 5 of the Federal Trade O>mmission Act and an antitrust problem under Section I of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Franchisors should be aware of the' conditions under which tying agreements are considered il legal. FTC Commissioner Wilbur Dixon suggests that four criteria should be applied in determin ing whether tying arrangements are illegal: (1) Does the arrangement in question involve two or more distinct items, one of which (the tying product-the franchise) may be obtained only if the other(s) is also purchased? (2) Is the tying item invested with sufficient economic power to restrain competitjon in the tied product(s)? (3) Is a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce af fected by the arrangement? And, if these lil-st three questions can b~ ans\\'ered aflirmativdy, (4) Is the respondent able to demonstrate by way 01 affirmative defense that the tie-in is necessary 10 ensure the quality of its products, or that 110 less restrictive means than the tie-in may be used to ensure such quality?16 
soft-service ice cream franchise), despite
CurVl']'s requirement that its ice nealll mix \\as to he purchased only from Carvel-designated sOllrcl?SY The commission chose not to define the restriction as an illegal tit'·in; rather, it decided to examine whether the supply restrictions were reasonably ancillary to the protection of the trademark and vindicated Carvel on this basis. In Susser \'. Carvel, the court found that a tie-in did exist. but concluded that ingredient-supply re strictions were justified by the need for quality control connected with the problem of ingredient secrecv.
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In the Chicken Delight case, several f1'anchisees challenged Chkken Delight's tranchising COIl tracts under Section I of the Sherman Act, seek ing treble damages_ 19 Chicken Delight I-equired that its franchisees purchase specified cookers, packaging items, and food preparation mixes. Apparently, the prices they were required to .pa~· for these products were higher than those of simi lar products generally available from alternate suurces. The franchisees cltallenged the agree ments as unlawful tying arTangements. The court rejected the "quality control" defense of the fran chisor as applied to the packaging products. The court reasoned that any competent packagillg manufacturer could have'iupplil'd salislactol \ packaging upon proper specificatioll 01 prillting type and color. However, as to the tied dips, spices, and cookers, which allegedly impart a se cret unique navor to the Chicken Delight product. the district court recognized that, under' Carvel, "the qualit~· control defense is relevant." The court then sent this issue to the jury with th\.' instmctions that it accep t the "qual it)' control" defense only if "specifications for a substitute would be so detailed that the~· could not practi cally be suppJied."20 The jurv determined that quality control could have been effected by means other than a tic-in.
A recent timelv decision concerning Chock Full O'Nuts Corpuration provides further clarification as tf.) how the FTC will intelprct the "quality con· trol" defense. 21 Chock full O'Nuts required its 38 franchisees to purchase from it a large number or: (a) food products manufactured by the franchisor bahT!, goods, and hamburger), (b) rood pruJudS,//ot manufactured b,' the franchisor k,g., milk, french fries, and suft drink syrups), and (c) Ilullfood products /loi manufal.:wrcd by the franchisor (e,g" napkins, straws, and glasses), Chu,:k Full O'Nuts defended its pral.:tice of tying the salt: ul these products to the sale of the fran Lhis~' by assc'l,ting thai it was necessary to main tain uniform quality throughollt all its restau rants. Th.... FTC held that th., "quality control" defense \\as applicable only where it was not pl'actk:ablc to spe(:ify the ingredients in such a wav as 10 render the item duplicable by compet ing' manutactLU'Crs. Upon examining the difficulty of adcquatdv specifying the ingredients for the various tied products, the FTC ruled:
IChock 1"1111 O'NlIls Corp.) sllccessfull" pruved its alfirmali\'e ddense [to Iyi ng charges I of mai n lain ing quali ty con trol \\ itb n:gard 10 its collee and bah'd goods, but not ~IS 10 its olhl.,T di!>tincti\'\.: p('()duLls th~tl franchisees were obligated to pm dlase.
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This decision se.... ms l.'unsistent with Can'el and Chick':ll Delight, Til" fntnllli~or Lln's Ihi.' (;Onniet between his dill' tlllder the Lallhalll Au to protecl the tradcmark through ljuaJity cuntrul and his dutv to a\'oiuvioialiofls ill the various antitrust laws. This dilemma has been rdern·J to as the "n:volv illg door" Sillt:C, 11." satisfving the requirements 01 one !->tatute, the frallchisor may lind that he has viulated anothec 21 Sl:wral experts havc suggested that in the vast majority of GlSeS quality (;ontrol can be accomplished by less restrictive means Ihan tying agn:ements,J4 In those cases where qualitv l:ontrol cunsiderations dictate tying agree llll.'nis. pn..lul:nce suggests that franchisors charge prices that arc reasonably l:ompetitiw with other suppliers,
Impact of Tying Agreements in Franchising
The data llsed to l'xplure the thr....c basic ques tions l:ullceming the impact uf tying agreements in frarll.:hising t:al1le frum a study on the el:unomil: effeus of franchising conducted at the University ()f Wisl:U!1sin·l'vladison. 25 The data base is a na 22. SaIHl" f'j.. :fcfvitl'I..' as ruolnOh-" 16 21, Same Ickt,'IIC" ' " 1"'>llltllL' l~. 1'. 1:;0 2·f non,dd F, Till ncr, "1'11,· \',didil\ "I '1\!I1~ AI' ,,1<1":,"
111v,'h I IIckr Ill,,' '\liI IIn"l t; l'" .. 11", ...""11, , /, , J(, '\I, 1\ \', , 1 72 ('.; ')\lil.b, ', I'J'i1i 
Extent of Practice
The first question examined was: How wide .~plead is the practice oj' franchisees beilzg required 10 plIrchase supplies 1;'0111 their franchisors? The re sults of the survey indicated that about 70% of the responding franchisees were required to purchase at least some of th..:ir operating supplies from tlwir franchisors, Of thuse frandlisees who had to purchase from theil' franchiwrs, the median per ct:ntage uf total uperating supplies that they purl.'hased fnml this source was 50%. It appeal's Ihat tving agn:C·Oll.'nts, far from being just an iso lakd practice that involves only a few franchisors. affect the lJ\erwhd ming majority of franchisees. who must purl:hase at least sum~ of their supplies frum their franchisors.
Prices Charged for Supplies
The sl.'cunu I'l..'st:al'ch question asked: Do fran chisees Hho are required to purchase sllpplies (ro/1/ (heir fimlChis()rs pay cOlllpetitive prices for these slipplies? The results, rl.'portcd in Table I. show that on I.\-' 24.8S':} uf the franchise....s bdieved they paid lower prkes to thl.' franchisor than they would in the open market, while 47.00/0 believed they paid higher prices to the franchisor. The re maining 28.2% perceived their franchisors' prices tu be about the saml.' as the prices of equivalent items th ....y cuuld purdlase elsewhere, Therefore. although a substantial number of franchisees ap parently felt they gut a price advantag..: by pur chasing from their franl.:hisors, many more bl.' Jie\'ed they were being overcharged. Jationship than franchisees who must purchase from their franchisors. As used in this study, fran only a small proportion of their supplies from chisee income included profit plus owner's salary their franchisors? (3) Are franchisees who are and any salaries paid to spouse and unmarried charged high prices by their franchisors less children. satisfied with the franchise relationship than
The results, as reported in Table 2 , also indicate franchisees who are charged low prices? These is that the proportion of supplies franchisees were sues were approached in the questionnaire by required to purchase from their franchisors was asking the franchisee: (1) what his family income negatively related to both measures of franchisee was from his franchised business before taxes, (2) satisfaction. Franchisees who did not plan to re whether he planned to renew his franchise new their franchises were required to purchase a agreement when it expired, and (3) how satisfied significantly higher percentage of their supplies he was with the profitability of his franchised bus from their franchisors than franchisees who iness up to this time.
planned to renew their franchises. Likewise, frall Using an F test, it was determined that fran chisees who were very dissatisfied with the chisees required to purchase supplies from their profitability of their franchised business were re franchisors had significantly lower incomes than quired to purchase a high percentage of their franchisees not required to purchase supplies supplies from the franchisor, while franchisees 
